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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SAMUEL R. THURMAN, 
Plaint~// and Appellant. 
vs 
ELDON EDWARD PARTRIDGE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8807 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Action by the plaintiff against the defendant to 
recover damages to his automobile arising out of an acci-
dent which occurred at about 11:20 A. M. on the 18th 
of February, 19 56, at the intersection of Cleveland 
Avenue and Major Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. De-
fendant filed a counterclaim for damage to his vehicle. 
From a judgment by Third District Judge, Joseph G. 
Jeppson, holding both parties guilty of negligence which 
contributed to the accident, the plaintiff has appealed. 
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The evidence will show that Major Street and Cleve-
land A venue are both narrow streets, with Cleveland Ave-
nue running east and west and Major Street north and 
south. Both streets are of blacktop construction with 
Cleveland Avenue being approximately 21 feet wide and 
Major Street approximately 3 5 feet, (R. 3 8). On the 
southeast corner of the intersection from the east edge of 
the blacktop on Major Street to the sidewalk on the east 
side of Major Street it is approximately 10-12 feet includ-
ing a small strip of grass, (R. 39). The sidewalk is about 
2-2-~ feet in width, (R. 33). There is a home on the 
southeast corner of the intersection which stands within 
18 inches to 2 feet of the sidewalk on Major Street, (R. 
34, 58 A), and within 2-3 feet of the sidewalk on Cleve-
land Avenue, (R. 43). A solid row of trees extends south 
from the southeast corner on the east side of Major Street, 
(R. 32), being about 1 foot west of the sidewalk, (R. 33), 
and there are about 3-4 trees extending east from the 
southeast corner on Cleveland Avenue, (R. 32). The 
trees and the home substantially obstructed the vision for 
north and westbound traffic approaching the intersection, 
( R. 3 4, 3 5, 50) . Defendant testified that the house and 
trees obstructed vision until a car approached a point 
where it almost entered the intersection, (R. 50). The 
Court found as a fact that vision was obstructed by the 
house and trees on the southeast corner of the intersection, 
(R. 69). 
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It had been snowing most of the morning but it was 
not snowing at the time of the accident. The snow was 
approximately 6 inches deep on the ground and on the 
two streets. 
The plaintiff was driving in a northerly direction 
on Major Street and the defendant in a westerly direction 
on Cleveland Avenue. At the Cleveland A venue entrance 
to the intersection there was placed ((Yield Right of Way" 
signs. The signs were approximately 24 inches along the 
top and each side and 12 inches across the bottom, (R. 42). 
Plaintiff testified that he approached the intersection 
at a speed of 20-25 miles per hour, (R. 25), and that when 
he was at a point about 20-30 feet from the interse~tion, 
(R. 25), he saw the defendant approaching from the east. 
At that time plaintiff said defendant's vehicle was 50 
feet east of the intersection and was approaching the inter-
section at a speed of 15 miles per hour and that it appeared 
to be slowing, (R. 26, 29). Plaintiff estimated defend-
ant's speed at impact at 10 miles per hour, (R. 29). 
Plaintiff did not notice defendant's vehicle again until 
plaintiff was almost through the intersection and just 
before the impact, (R. 3 8) . 
Defendant, on the other hand, testified that he was 
at the east sidewalk line or 6-8 feet east of it traveling 
10 miles per hour, (R. 49), when he first observed the 
plaintiff's car which was then 3 0 to 3 5 feet south of the 
south sidewalk line of the intersection, (R. 51), and that 
plaintiff's vehicle was traveling 2 5 miles per hour and 
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did not slow at any time, (R. 53, 59). Defendant had 
looked to the south before arriving at the intersection but 
stated he did not see plaintiff's vehicle, (R. 56). He 
looked north and then again south at which time he saw 
plaintiff's vehicle, (R. 56). He applied his brakes and 
attempted to turn to the right to avoid the accident but 
was unable to stop or turn much, (R. 49). 
The left front of the defendant's vehicle struck the 
right center portion of plaintiff's vehicle, (R. 53), at a 
point just east of the center line of Major Street and when 
the front of plaintiff's vehicle was at about the north 
line of the intersection, (R. 54) . Defendant had ap-
proached the intersection from a point about 100-150 feet 
back of the intersection at a speed of about 15 miles per 
hour, (R. 46, 47, 59), and was slowing as he approached. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE UPON THE PART 
OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
POINT II. 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WITH 
RESPECT TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAIN-
TIFF ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
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POINT III. 
THERE WAS NO IRREGULARITY IN THE 
PROCEEDINGS Of' THE COURT AND NO ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION BY THE COURT. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED UNDER THE 
FACTS TO THE RIGHT OF WAY AT THE INTER-
SECTION UNDER THE STATE STATUTE PER-
TAINING TO RIGHT OF WAY GOVERNING OPEN 
INTERSECTIONS BECAUSE THE PLACEMENT 
OF THE YIELD RIGHT OF WAY SIGN AT THE 
INTERSECTIO,N ENTRANCE FROM CLEVELAND 
A VENUE WAS INVALID AND INEFFECTIVE. 
((A" THE CITY ORDINANCE AUTHORIZ-
ING PLACEMENT OF STOP SIGNS WAS 
INVALID BECAUSE IT ESTABLISHED 
A RULE OF EVIDENCE. 
((B" THE YIELD RIGHT OF WAY SIGN WAS 
NOT PLACED OR USED IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH THE STATE STATUTE 
AND AS PRESCRIBED BY THE SIGN 
MANUAL OF THE STATE ROAD COM-
MISSION. 
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uc" THE YIELD RIGHT OF WAY SIGN DID 
NOT CONFORM TO THE SPECIFICA-
TIONS OF THE SIGN MANUAL PER-
TAINING TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY 
SIGNS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS I AND II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
FINDING CONTRffiUTORY NEGLIGENCE UPON 
THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF AND TiiE FIND-
INGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WITH RESPECT TO 
NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF ARE SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiff's own evidence is that he approached the 
intersection at a speed of 20-25 miles per hour. He did 
not at any time reduce his speed although the evidence 
is clear that visibility is very limited and restricted for 
the driver of west and northbound vehicles approachin{ 
the intersection. The vision was obstructed by a homt 
constructed on the southeast corner within 18 inches to 
2 feet of the sidewalk on Major Street and 2-3 feet of the 
sidewalk on Cleveland A venue. The west side of the 
home was not over 12-14 feet from the blacktop edge of 
the street, or about 4-5 feet from the shoulder of the road, 
and had a solid line of trees to the west of it which also 
obstructed vision. The conditions on the north side of 
the home were somewhat similar. The street was covered 
with snow and it was slippery. With the limited visibility 
and the slippery condition of the road plaintiff could not 
have brought his vehicle to a stop at a point from the 
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20-30 feet south of the intersection where he states he first 
saw defendant's vehicle, or could have seen defendant's 
vehicle before colliding with other vehicles entering the 
intersection. Utah's basic speed law, Section 41-6-46 
( 1 ) , Utah Code Annotated 19 5 3, provides that no person 
shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than 
is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having 
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing . 
. . . Subsection 3 provides: ((The driver of every vehicle 
shall consistent with the requirements of Subdivision 
( 1) of this section drive at an appropriately reduced speed 
when approaching and crossing an intersection ... and 
when special hazards exist with respect to ... other traffic 
or by reason of weather or highway conditions."' On a 
dry highway at 25 miles per hour it would take plaintiff 
approximately 61 feet to stop after discovering danger. 
However, on snow it would take him much further before 
he could bring his vehicle to a halt. Considering his speed, 
the limited visibility at the intersection and the slippery 
highway, the court might very easily and properly con-
clude that plaintiff was driving too fast for existing con-
ditions in view of all the existing hazards. 
Section 41-6-72. 10 (c) Utah Code Annotated 1953 
as amended provides as follows: 
uwhen a Yield Right-of-Way sign is erected, 
the driver of a vehicle approaching said sign shall 
slow to a reasonable speed for existing conditions 
of traffic and visibility, yielding right-of-way to 
all vehicles and pedestrians on the intersecting street 
which are so close as to constitute an immediate 
hazard." 
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The statute does not require vehicles to come to a stop 
at the Yield Right-of-Way sign in all instances but to 
slow and yield the right of way to all vehicles on the 
intersecting street which are so close as to constitute an 
immediate hazard. It, therefore, requires the exercise 
of judgment upon the party approaching the sign to deter-
mine whether the vehicle approaching on the intersecting 
street constitutes an immediate hazard. If the aproach-
ing car is an immediate hazard, the right of way must be 
yielded to it and the non-favored driver must, if necessary, 
come to a stop. However, if the non-favored driver 
fails to see the other car approaching the intersection or 
does not consider him an immediate hazard, he will not 
stop at the Yield Right-of-Way sign and there is, there-
fore, a duty upon the part of the favored driver to exercise 
more caution in approaching such an intersection than if 
he were approaching one guarded by a stop sign. 
Each driver approaching such an intersection has a 
relative duty to approach with caution in view of all the 
circumstances and each one has a right to rely upon the 
fact that the other driver is required to act in a reason-
able prudent manner under all the conditions exsiting at 
the time. 
Plaintiff testified that when he was 20-30 feet away 
from the intersection he was going 20-25 miles per hour 
and that defendant was at that time at a point 50 feet 
east of the intersection and going 10-15 miles per hour. 
Defendant's testimony substantiates the speed of the re-
spective vehicles. Plaintiff was, therefore, going about 
twice as fast as the defendant. Plaintiff's statement of 
defendant's position at the time he saw him is obviously 
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erroneous. The defendant's testimony with respect to 
the position of the two vehicles is apparently the more 
accurate. If plaintiff had been traveling at a slower 
speed which the existing conditions required, each driver 
would have had more time and a better opportunity to ob-
serve the approach of the other and avoid the accident. 
The evidence clearly supports the court's finding 
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. 
It cannot be said under the circumstances that the 
plaintiff was free from negligence as a matter of law and 
the finding of the trial court in this instance is binding 
upon the appellate court. 
Knowing that the intersection had a blind corner on 
it, he should have approached the intersection at a much 
slower speed so that he could control his vehicle under the 
existing circumstances in the event traffic approached 
from the east. 
((A motorist approaching an intersection 
whose view is obstructed should have his car under 
such control without regard to the question of 
statutory priority of right of way, and hence stat-
utes or ordinances providing for or designating 
through ways or streets do not ordinarily modify 
requirements regarding speed in approaching ob-
structed intersections." 2 Blashfield 372, Sec. 1041. 
POINT III. THERE WAS NO IRREGULARITY IN 
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT AND NO 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE COURT. 
Plaintiff's counsel has filed a Statement of Trial 
Judge which he claims supports his contention that there 
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was irregularity in the proceedings in that the trial judge 
viewed the premises without the counsel being present and 
also an abuse of discretion for the same reason. 
The record fails to support plaintiff's contention. At 
the commencement of the trial while plaintiff's counsel 
was making his opening statement he stated that the 
accident occurred at the intersection of Cleveland Ave-
nue and Major Street. The trial judge at that time stated 
that he knew the corner. Other statements made by the 
court which are not part of the record were that he had 
traveled that intersection many times; that he used to 
travel it on his way to work and was quite familiar with it. 
On the morning of the argument, the court stated 
that he had driven by the intersection again on his way to 
court that morning and again noted the intersection. The 
record does not show nor did the court state that his 
decision was based upon or influenced by his observa-
tions made on the morning of the argument. 
ulna case tried before the trial judge without 
a jury, where the judge acts as a trier of facts, ac-
cording to the weight of authority he may, in his 
discretion, view the premises in dispute or where 
material facts occurred, even in the absence of any 
statutory authorization." Section 1128, 53 Am. 
Jur. 784. 
On the morning set for the argument of the case 
plaintiff's counsel had a trial scheduled in the City Court 
of Salt Lake City, although he did not mention it to the 
trial judge the day before. He was, however, going to 
have his associate counsel try the City Court case but 
when he was unable to secure his services for the City 
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Court trial, he made the appearance himself and sought 
to have the District Court Judge postpone the argu-
ment on the morning set for the argument and objected 
to the District Court proceeding with the argument of 
the case. At that time the court stated that he was ready 
to decide the case whether plaintiff was ready to argue 
his case or not. He did not state what his decision was 
or would be and counsel for defendant understood the 
court to mean that the appointed time was set and had 
arrived and the court was ready to decide the case whether 
or not counsel was ready to argue. In fact, the court 
stated that counsel had no right to assume that he could 
leave the case in the District Court and enter trial in 
another court until the case was completed in the District 
Court. 
We cannot see that the record or the facts sustain 
plaintiff's contention of irregularity or abuse of discre-
tion upon the part of the court. The record clearly 
sustains the court's finding of negligence upon the part 
of the plaintiff. 
POINT IV. DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED, UN-
DER THE FACTS, TO THE RIGHT OF WAY AT 
THE INTERSECTION UNDER THE STATE STAT-
UTE PERTAINING TO RIGHT OF WAY GOVERN-
ING OPEN INTERSECTIONS BECAUSE THE 
PLACEMENT OF THE YIELD RIGHT-OF-WAY 
SIGN AT THE INTERSECTION ENTRANCE FROM 
CLEVELAND A VENUE WAS INVALID AND IN-
EFFECTIVE. 
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uA" THE CITY ORDINANCE AUTHORIZ-
ING PLACEMENT OF THE YIELD 
RIGHT OF WAY SIGNS IS INVALID BE-
CAUSE IT ESTABLISHES A RULE OF EVI-
DENCE. 
Utah's State Statute authorizing Yield Right-of-
Way signs was enacted during the Legislative Session of 
19 5 5 and pr<:.vides as follows: 
cc41-6-72. 10. Yield right-of-way signs.-
( a) The state road commission, with reference to 
state highways, and local authorities, with refer-
ence to highways under their jurisdiction, may at 
certain intersections, where safety and efficiency 
require the normal right-of-way rule to be modi-
fied in favor of one of the highways, erect and 
maintain a yield right-of-way sign at such inter-
sections on the minor approaches. 
(b) The Yield Right-of-Way sign shall 
conform to the specifications outlined in the sign 
manual of the state road commission. 
(c) When a Yield Right-of-Way sign is 
erected, the driver of a vehicle approaching said 
sign shall slow to a reasonable speed for existing 
conditions of traffic and visibility. yielding right-
of-way to all vehicles and pedestrians on the inter-
secting street which are so close as to constitute an 
immediate hazard. 
(d) If a motorist approaches an intersection 
and finds a car has been stopped at Yield Right-of-
Way sign on an intersecting approach and has been 
waiting to enter and then starts to enter. the on-
coming motorist shall yield the right-of-way to 
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him in the same manner as if he had been waiting 
at a stop sign." 
The ordinance passed by the City Commission under 
the authority granted in the State Statute is as follows: 
((Sec. 207. Yield right-of-way signs. The City 
Traffic Engineer shall erect and maintain a (Yield 
Right-of-Way' sign at all intersections where di-
rected by the Board of City Commissioners and 
when said sign is erected the driver of the vehicle 
approaching a (Yield Right-of-Way' sign shall slow 
to a reasonable speed for existing conditions of 
traffic and visibility, yielding right-of-way to 
all vehicles and pedestrians on the intersecting 
street which are so close as to constitute an imme-
diate hazard. 
( 1) The driver of any vehicle proceeding 
past a (Yield Right-of-way' sign facing his ve-
hicle and who interferes with or collides with the 
movement of any vehicle proceeding on the inter-
secting street shall be deemed prima facie in viola-
tion of the section. 
( 2) If a motorist approaches an intersection 
and finds a car has been stopped at a (Yield' sign 
on an intersecting approach and has been waiting 
to enter and then starts to enter, the oncoming 
motorist shall yield the right-of-way to him in the 
same manner as if he had been waiting at a (Stop' 
stgn. 
( 3) A person violating this section shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor.'J (Italics ours) 
It is to be noted that sub-paragraph 1 of said ordi-
nance establishes a rule of evidence in connection with 
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the driver proceeding past a yield right-of-way sign fac-
ing his vehicle and who collides with a vehicle proceeding 
on the intersecting street. 
In the case of Nasfell vs. Ogden City (122 Ut. 344), 
249 Pac. ( 2d) , 5 07, our Supreme Court had before it 
an Ogden City Ordinance which read as follows: 
uThe presence of a vehicle in or upon any 
public street or highway in Ogden City stopped, 
standing or parking in violation of any ordinance 
of Ogden City, shall be prima facie evidence that 
the person in whose name such vehicle is registered 
as owner, committed or authorized the commission 
of such violation." 
Our Supreme Court held that the ordinance was 
invalid and we quote from the decision as follows: 
uu nder the decisions of this court Ogden has 
no express or implied power to pass the ordinance in 
question. Cities in Utah derive their powers 
through express legislative grant, and we look to 
our own authority in testing Ogden's powers to 
pass the ordinance. Counsel for Ogden cites but one 
Utah case, which we do not believe controlling 
here, and looks for support of his position to sister 
states where fountains of power radically may 
differ from our own. Repeatedly we have denied 
to cities implied powers which had far greater 
proximity of purpose in implementing express 
powers gtven, than the implied power claimed here 
bears to the generic power granted by the legis-
lature. 
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Ogden assumes that because cities have been 
the power to regulate streets and the parking of 
vehicles for a fee, together with general power to 
enforce such powers, they necessarily have the im-
plied power to pass an ordinance establishing a rule 
of evidence binding on the courts. Such assump-
tion does not stand the test of logic, nor is it 
sustained by this cour·... Power to pass an ordinance 
establishing a rule of evidence binding on the 
courts is not granted to cities in express words, nor 
can it be fairly implied from, nor is it incident to, 
the powers expressly given. Neither is it essential 
to the accomplishment of the objects and purposes 
of the powers granted. 
We are committed to the principle that cities 
have none of the elements of sovereignty, that uany 
fair, reasonable substantial doubt concerning the 
existence of the power is resolved by the courts 
against the corporation (city) and the power 
denied." ... uand that grants of power to cities are 
strictly construed to the exclusion of implied 
powers not reasonably necessary in carrying out the 
purposes of the express powers granted." 
It is therefore counsel's contention that the decision 
in this case is controlling and that the Salt Lake City 
ordinance is invalid. 
UB" and uc." THE YIELD RIGHT-OF-WAY 
SIGN WAS NOT PLACED OR 
USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE STATE STATUTE AND AS 
PRESCRIBED BY THE SIGN 
MANUALOFTHESTATEROAD 
COMMISSION; and THE YIELD 
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RIGHT-OF-WAY SIGN DID 
NOT CONFORM TO THE SPE-
CIFICATIONS OF THE SIGN 
MANUAL PERTAINING TO 
YIELD RIGHT-OF-WAY SIGNS. 
In authorizing the use of Yield Right-of-Way signs 
the Legislature provided in paragraph (b) of said statute 
that the Yield Right-of-Way sign shall conform to the 
specifications outlined in the Sign Manual of the State 
Road Commission. The State Road Commission has 
enacted the following specification in connection with 
Yield Right-of-Way signs: 
UYIELD RIGHT -OF-wAY" SIGN 
The Yield Right-of-Way sign shall be an 
equilateral triangle with one point downward, 
having a yellow reflectorized background with 
black lettering. Its sides shall be a minimum of 30 
inches in length. It shall be erected in the same 
manner as the Stop sign. 
Placement shall be authorized by the Traffic 
Engineer only. 
WARRANTS FOR YIELD RIGHT-OF-WAY SIGNS 
At no place should Yield Right-of-Way signs 
be used unless (a) there is relatively light traffic 
entering the heavier traveled road from the inter-
secting road; (b) or where the crossing or merging 
traffic streams at an intersection are about equal 
in volume with frequent intervals in each that 
permit safe crossing and merging movements of 
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~ehicles; (c) and where there is good visibility in 
both or all directions; (d) and unless it is clearly 
shown that traffic will be effectively controlled 
through the use of the Yield Right-of-Way signs. 
Whenever there is any doubt as to the effectiveness 
of its use, install Stop signs or other controls in-
stead." (Italics ours) 
The yield right-of-way sign at Cleveland Avenue 
according to the testimony was not in the shape of a 
triangle, nor was it 30 inches by 30 inches by 30 inches. 
The testimony was that the sign was in the shape shown 
in Exhibit I and the dimensions were approximately 24 
by 24 by 24 by 12 inches. It did not, therefore, even 
substantially comply with the specification pertaining to 
size and shape. 
Counsel directs the Court's attention to the second 
paragraph of said Specifications, which provides that 
Yield Right-of-Way signs should not be used unless there 
is good visibility in both or all directions. The evidence 
introduced in this case clearly showed that the southeast 
corner of the intersection had very poor visibility in that 
both the home and the trees on said corner constituted a 
block to visibility. Plaintiff and defendant both testified 
of this fact, and the court made a specific finding that 
visibility was obstructed at the intersection. 
In order to be a valid ordinance, the city had first 
to enact an ordinance complying with authority granted 
by State Statute and then to set up its signs in conformance 
with the State Manual and Specifications established by 
the State Road Commission. Section 41-6-22, U.C.A. 
19 53, provides as follows: 
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((41-6-22. Placing and maintenance upon 
local highways by local authorities.-Local authori-
ties, in their respective jurisdictions, shall place and 
maintain such traffic-control devices upon high-
ways under their jurisdiction as they may deem 
necessary to indicate and to carry out the pro-
visions of this act or local traffic ordinances or to 
regulate, warn or guide traffic. All such traffic-
control devices hereafter erected shall conform to 
and be maintained in conformance with the state 
manual and specifications." (Italics ours) 
The court's attention is also directed to Section 41-
6-16, which provides: 
((The provisions of this act shall be applicable 
and uniform throughout this state and in all polit-
ical subdivisions and municipalities therein and no 
local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or 
regulation in conflict with the provisions of this 
act unless expressly authorized herein. Local 
authorities may, however, adopt regulations con-
sistent with this act, and additional traffic regula-
tions which are not in conflict therewith." 
The city failed to enact a valid ordinance. t-l," "....-r. 
ifications with respect to the size and shape of the signs 
were not followed and the signs were not placed in con-
formance with the State Manual. They, therefore, have 
no legal significance. 
While counsel was unable to find any cases pertaining 
to yield right-of-way signs, we feel that the following 
cases pertaining to stop signs and ordinances are in point 
and are governing as to the ordinance and yield right· 
of-way signs in question. 
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In the case of Bartlett vs. McDonald (Ohio, Mar. 
26, 1937), 17 N·.E. (2d) 284, the city of Youngstown, 
Ohio, enacted an ordinance establishing one of two inter-
secting streets as a main thoroughfare, but failed to erect 
stop signs at the intersection as required by the state 
statute authorizing the local authorities to enact ordi-
nances establishing main thoroughfares. An accident 
ensued and one of the two drivers involved in the accident 
filed suit against the other. The party driving on the 
street declared by the ordinance to be a main thoroughfare 
claimed the right-of-way by reason of the ordinance, 
whereas, the other party claimed the right-of-way by vir-
tue of the state statute. The court held the ordinance 
invalid for the reason that the stop signs had not been 
erected, and the plaintiff, who under the ordinance was 
the unfavored driver, was allowed to recover. 
In the case of Daniels, et al. vs. Ramirez, et al, ( 1947 
Texas), 209 S. W. (2d) 972, a collision occurred at an 
intersection between a school bus in which the deceased, 
Ramirez, was a passenger and a Chevrolet sedan owned by 
Daniels. The jury found both defendants, to-wit: the 
driver of the school bus and the driver of the Chevrolet 
sedan guilty of negligence. The bus driver was found 
negligent for his failure to stop at a stop sign facing the 
bus. The other driver claimed he was on a through high-
way and it was therefore not required that he stop, and 
that the bus driver should have stopped. The court held 
that inasmuch as the stop sign was erected without author-
ity and maintained without it, it could impose no duty 
upon the bus driver, and therefore under the record of the 
case, the stop sign was no protection for Daniels, the 
driver on the through highway. 
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In the case of Albrecht Grocery Company vs. Over-
field, (Ohio 1929), 168 N. E. 386, the police department 
placed stop signs at an intersection but the City of Akron, 
Ohio, failed to pass the ordinance authorizing the place-
ment of the stop sign. A collision occurred between a 
vehicle driven in a northerly direction on West Cedar 
Street and one being driven in an easterly direction on 
Bishop Street. Stop signs were placed on Bishop Street 
where it entered West Cedar Street, requiring drivers on 
Bishop Street to stop for traffic proceeding along West 
Cedar Street. The Albrecht Grocery Company truck being 
driven on Bishop Street failed to stop at the stop sign 
placed on Bishop Street and the other party secured a 
judgment in the trial court against the driver proceeding 
through the stop sign. On appeal the appellate court 
stated as follows: 
«The Council of the City of Akron not having 
passed the ordinance so authorized to be passed, 
it is quite immaterial whether the police depart-
ment erected the signs claimed by the plaintiff in 
error to have been erected, or whether these signs 
were erected near or far from said intersections. 
Signs so erected do not have any legal effect what-
ever and no one is required to pay any attention to 
them." 
In the case of Popp vs. Barger. 264 Ill. App. 484, 
( 19 3 2) , plaintiff brought action against defendant to 
recover for damages when a collision occurred on account 
of defendant's failure to stop at a stop sign guarding the 
intersection where the accident occurred on that portion 
of the highway traveled by the defendant. The court 
held that the failure of the Department of Public Works 
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and Buildings to place a stop sign at the entrance to the 
state highway did not relieve the plaintiff from stopping; 
it was his statutory duty. The same statute gives the 
defendant the right of way and did not require him to 
stop before entering the intersection. The court said: 
Hit is unfortunate that the Department of 
Public Works and Buildings failed to place stop 
signs on 25th Street, on which street the plaintiff 
was traveling. It wasn't defendant's fault that 
they failed to place said signs. The plaintiff saw 
the defendant coming 75 feet away, but thought 
he would stop for the stop signs. Defendant trav-
eling on the through highway had the right of way, 
even though the stop signs faced him." 
In LeGere vs. Bunicky, N.H. (1943), 35 Ad. (2) 
508, the action involved a collision in an intersection of 
cars proceeding at right angles to each other. Plaintiffs 
were passengers in the defendant's car. Defendant drove 
through a stop sign while proceeding in a northerly direc-
tion on Pearl Street and was struck by an East bound car 
on Myrtle Street. The defendant requested that the jury 
be instructed that the stop sign was not legally established 
and that the law of the road relative to intersecting ways 
be charged. 
The requests which were not given, raised the issue 
of whether the stop sign was legally placed, and if so, the 
effect of such signs. The court said of course if the 
sign was not placed in accordance with statutory author-
ity directly or under an ordinance, then it was a mere 
circumstance of the accident, entitled to such considera-
tion as a warning and a suggestion for caution in operating 
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a motor vehicle as a reasonable driver under the circum-
stances would give it but without legal requirement 
beyond its bearing as a detail of a situation upon due care 
of a driver passing northerly through Pearl Street and 
approaching Myrtle Street. 
See also Hoover vs. Blackmore (Ohio), 87 N.E. (2), 
477. 
It is obvious from the decisions rendered in these 
cases that the Yield Right-of-Way Sign involved in the 
case before the court had no legal significance and that, 
at most, it could be considered as just one other factor 
involved in the accident along with all the others in 
considering the duties of the respective parties. In other 
words, the intersection would be considered as an open 
intersection, and under the circumstances the negligence 
of the plaintiff in failing to yield the right of way to the 
defendant would bar the plaintiff from recovery in this 
case, as said negligence was a proximate cause of the 
accident. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence clearly supports the court's finding 
of contributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff. 
No abuse of discretion or irregularity in proceedings was 
committed by the court. 
The ordinance enacted by the City of Salt Lake 
was invalid because it established a rule of evidence. The 
Yield Right-of-Way sign placed under the ordinance did 
not meet the specifications of the State Mutual with 
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respect to size and shape and furthermore was placed 
at an intersection where visibility was not good contrary 
to the directive in the State Manual, and it was, therefore, 
ineffective and its placement invalid. The State Statute 
pertaining to right of way at open intersections governed 
the rights of the parties and defendant had the right of 
way. Plaintiff's failure to yield the right of way to the 
defendant constituted negligence. 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH & STRONG and 
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHA YS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
604-610 Boston Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
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